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Socialist and Post-Socialist  
Functional Elites in East Germany 
Axel Salheiser  
Abstract: »Sozialistische und postsozialistische Eliten in Ostdeutschland«. 
This paper provides a brief overview of elite change and continuity in East 
Germany as a post-socialist society. To do so, at first, some peculiarities of the 
former cadre system and elites in Socialist East Germany, i.e. the late German 
Democratic Republic, are addressed with regard to social structure develop-
ment and the arrangement of generations. Selected empirical evidence is based 
on cross-sectoral, longitudinal and cohort analyses and the inspection of proso-
pographic elite data compiled until the end of the 1980s which deconstruct the 
myth of a levelled egalitarian Socialist society. In the second part of the paper, 
elite change and continuity after the political change of 1989/90 is discussed in 
the context of the transformation of institutions. Inspired by Bourdieu’s analyt-
ic paradigm, one central thesis on the career survivals, take-offs, and break-
downs of East German elites is the continued validity and efficacy of social 
and cultural capital obtained before the fall of the Wall, most of all formal qua-
lification. Dimensions of vertical social inequality under Socialist rule, such as 
gender and class background, remain to be decisive until today. 
Keywords: East Germany, GDR, post-socialism, elites, transformation, Ger-
man Unification. 
1. Introduction 
Transformation in East Germany has been characterized as a special case of 
post-socialist societal development (Reißig 1997). In East Germany, rapidly 
“added” to West Germany, there was a relatively smooth transition with clear-
cut directions and goals, there was no partial or iterative “institution shopping”, 
no trial and error of developmental policies or the like as in other CEE coun-
tries but a radical 1:1 transfer of the West German framework, i.e. the imple-
mentation and consolidation of ready-made institutions, which were merely 
extended to the five new federal states. A hitherto Socialist society had dis-
solved over night and was immediately incorporated to a Western market de-
mocracy which was beyond any historical or contemporary example. However, 
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especially this fast way of German Unification led to a conflict between the 
new and the old social order, namely the persisting structural and socio-
economical conditions, in short: the remnants of Socialism, especially the 
claims, expectations, the biographical experiences, and orientations of East 
German citizens. One of the central questions was: What would become of the 
old elites? To what extend would they prove to be compatible with Western 
market democracy? Post-socialist elite change has been characterized as a 
development from the ideologically unified cadre nomenclatura of the old 
Socialist regime to consensually unified but functionally differentiated elites in 
a posttransformational, democratic society. In Germany, this also included the 
cultural convergence of elites from different backgrounds and with different 
biographical experiences. However, many cultural gaps have remained between 
the East and the West. Differences ceased to exist only in the very youngest 
generation of Germans who have been born after 1989, who have been entirely 
socialized in unified Germany and whose everyday life is less affected by the 
emotional reservations, the biographical experiences or historical burdens of 
their elders. 
In this article an overview of elite change and continuity in East Germany as 
a post-socialist society is given. To do so, first, some peculiarities of the former 
cadre system and elites in Socialist East Germany, i.e. the late German Demo-
cratic Republic, are addressed with regard to social structure development and 
the arrangement of generations. I would like to present a small selection of 
empirical evidence from a research project on GDR elites and societal differen-
tiation which is led by Heinrich Best and associated with the Collaborative 
Research Centre 580 at Friedrich Schiller University, Jena, Germany. In the 
second part of the paper, I will discuss the ways and conditions of elite change 
and continuity after the political change of 1989/90, before I draw some con-
clusions with regard to the roles and attitudes of East German elites and masses 
in the process of German Unification.  
2. GDR Society and Social Structure 
To address the issue of elite circulation and reproduction in East German trans-
formation, it is necessary to take a look back at GDR society and social struc-
ture as it had developed until the end of the 1980s. 40 years of Socialist socie-
ties meant three generations living their lives, being socialized and facing 
different historical conditions and challenges under Socialist rule that deter-
mined their social opportunities and attitudes (cf. Niethammer 1994, Nietham-
mer et al. 1991). The first generation, born in the 1920s and 1930s, embraced 
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the chance of a new start after the experience of National Socialist dictatorship1 
and the Second World War in the formative period of the GDR in the 1950s 
and early 1960s. Many of them identified with the Socialist project and the 
promise of a radical break with traditional class society, which included the 
expropriation and dismissal of old elites and the counter-privileging of the 
working-class. When in retrospection, political leaders of the GDR have collec-
tively counted their citizens among the “winners of history”, maybe it espe-
cially held true for those who were born in the 1920s and 1930s. Indeed they 
experienced high rates of social mobility, due to their activism and enthusiasm 
they were promoted in the new state of “workers and peasants”, they were 
granted higher education (via special “Worker’s and Farmer’s Faculties” at the 
universities, cf. Miethe 2007) and soon they filled the ranks and positions in the 
cadre system. Also, there were a rapid development of a new economy, as well 
as remarkable efforts and achievements of raising the catastrophic living stan-
dards of the post-war years. This, after a long period of hardships, eventually 
seemed to compensate for the socialist regime’s non-existing democratic le-
gitimacy and the dictatorial repression especially in the 1950s. One of the most 
noteworthy accomplishments was the high rates of women employment that 
became a trademark of the GDR labor system. Women also climbed to sube-
lite-level positions in many societal fields, especially in the civil and social 
services, but they could rarely made their way to the very top – of course, this 
glass-ceiling effect is discussed again today with respect to modern Western 
societies. However, the GDR’s early efforts in “gender equality” were at least 
among the most progressive ones in contemporary international comparison. 
Due to such achievements and means of identification mentioned above, the 
first generation of GDR citizens was the recruitment pool of the most loyal 
exponents of nomenclatura. 
The second generation, including East Germans born until about 1960, in 
the phase of economic growth and stability, have mostly been socialized under 
the Socialist rule and benefitted from the social achievements of the GDR and 
the advanced system of education and vocational trainings, but later they expe-
rienced stagnation and decline in the 1970s and 1980s. Compared to the gener-
ation of their parents, they faced far worse career opportunities and a blockage 
of advancements (cf. Mayer 1994) in the nomenclatura system in which the 
decisive and attractive positions were mostly occupied by the firstcomers. 
Women workers still were promoted to engineers or researchers, but despite 
                                                             
1  Antifascism belonged to the most important founding myths of the GDR (Ahbe 2007). 
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their training, they could hardly become somebody else than the decorative 
makeshifts in a dysfunctional and inefficient manufacturing industry (Nickel 
1993, Ansorg 1999).  
Now, social closure was also indicated by the sharper redefinition of social 
milieus, e.g. the reinvention and diffusion of a conformist petit-bourgeois-
orientation in the functional elites and the intelligentsia, who formed a social 
stratum clearly separated from the working-class. In the second GDR genera-
tion, more and more citizens covertly distanced themselves from the regime 
and its claims, considering all the shortcomings and failures now so obvious.  
In terms of social structure development, the third and last generation of the 
GDR, was the product of a re-established class inequality indicated by high 
rates of social reproduction. They were only adolescents or young adults on the 
very verge of system collapse. This generation of grandchildren was raised and 
indoctrinated in a false and artificial social pastoral. However, they faced a 
sclerotized society without perspectives – at the end of the day, the Socialist 
future had been used up. They were of course too young to hold relevant posi-
tions in the cadre nomenclatura, but due to their non-encumbrance and their 
“blank biographies”, their prerequisites for system change were much better 
than those of their elders.  
One of our central research theses is that the increased social inequality in 
the last period of the GDR already pointed at the direction of post-socialist 
social differentiation, or in other words, that the Socialist society of real-
existing inequality featured a certain kind of connectivity to the West German 
Capitalist or bourgeois class society. I would like to argue that this connectivity 
prepared the opportunity structures for post-socialist elite continuity and social 
inclusion and, accordingly, this has reduced social friction in the process of 
German Unification (cf. Best et al. 2012).  
I’d like to support this argument discussing some empirical findings about 
the GDR society and its elites. The quantitative analyses of our research project 
on GDR elite groups and societal development are based on sets of large Proc-
ess-Generated Data from the GDR cadre administration. One of the most useful 
and unique datasets is the Zentraler Kaderdatenspeicher (ZKDS)/Central Cadre 
Database (CCDB), which was established and assembled on behalf of the 
Council of Ministers of the GDR (Remy 2006). The CCD comprises a vast 
collection of anonymous individual data. It contains a great variety of informa-
tion on the job biographies, social backgrounds, societal functions etc. of GDR 
functional elites, members of the Nomenclatura in administration, economy, 
the education system, health care, transport, science, culture etc. The Power 
elites escape the perspective of a quantitative data analysis, because, unfortu-
nately, the large databases of the Party apparatus are no longer available today.  
Among the ca. 700,000 records in the database, about 170,000 to 180,000 
persons qualify as members of ‘functional elites’ with regard to their position 
in the organisational hierarchy: including higher executives/directors of com-
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panies, or the heads of departments in administration from the low level of 
regional units up to the government centrals in East Berlin. Although regarded 
functionaries of the state, the functional elites in economy, science or medicine, 
or a number of other societal subsystems, could be distinguished from elites of 
the societal centre of power, that is Party and government nomenclatura, with 
respect to their political affiliation or party alignment, their levels of qualifica-
tion, and their social backgrounds. In general, not only the social structure of 
the GDR but Socialist elites themselves showed an remarkable extent of hori-
zontal and vertical differentiation, even though ideology continuously pro-
claimed and propagated the illusion of social equality and collective unity.  
A working-class background and profound party alignment, such as Party 
membership and honorary posts in the Party apparatus, became the supreme 
prerequisite and asset for Socialist elites. The very power elite, e.g., the high-
ranking officials of the Communist state Party SED and the leadership of the 
state, formed a caste-like stratum that regarded and staged themselves as the 
avant-garde of the Proletariate. Their legitimacy was founded on the historical 
landmark of the revolution, their ideological claims, their own personal history 
of persecution by Fascism or, at least, by the symbolical inheritance of the 
revolutionary forces of the Working-Class. 
In fact, within the power elites there actually was a clearly dominant repre-
sentation of persons with a working-class background, but the share of false 
and favourable categorizations of occupations of fathers, was, roughly esti-
mated 10-20% (cf. Salheiser 2003). And despite the official equality policy, at 
least one half of the working-class, namely women, stayed blatantly under-
represented within the party and government top. Given the modest average 
level of qualification, especially among the older power elites, political affilia-
tion and commitment to Communist ideology could be identified as the central 
criteria of allocation to the power elite.  
However, in the field of functional elites, criteria of personnel allocation and 
status distribution get into focus that were not altogether incongruous to the 
respective modes in Western societies (cf. Salheiser 2006). Top-level func-
tional elites, for instance in economy or science, typically boasted a “double 
qualification” – besides their professional assets (like vocational trainings, 
academic education etc.) they had often participated in courses at central and 
regional Party schools and even held degrees in so-called Social Sciences 
which had been obtained by studies in Marxism-Leninism on a pseudo-
academic level. Such political qualifications were of high symbolic value and 
could be considered a means of status affirmation rather than a necessary pre-
condition to climb on the career ladder. Advanced party schoolings strength-
ened and underlined the elevated nomenclatura status (Salheiser 2009). As 
regression analysis indicates, such political assets were, however, non-
complementary for functional qualification and professional aptitude, or exper-
tise. In this aspect, Socialist functional elites, commonly referred to as the 
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Technocrats, were in some way in between Western elites with whom they 
partly shared a professional orientation, and the Socialist power elites, or the 
Ideologists, whom they were separated from because many of the latter solely 
relied on their party affiliation and “owed everything to the Party”, as Pierre 
Bourdieu (1991) pointed out. 
GDR’s functional elites yielded no political power, but nevertheless, they 
ran the Socialist society. Compared to the average workers, or lower white-
collar employees, those cadres were characterized by the privileged access to 
societal resources and informal networks, they earned higher incomes and had 
a petit-bourgeois life-style including distinct patterns of consumption and lei-
sure activities. Also, given their political loyalty, many of them were allowed 
to travel to Capitalist countries which was an enormous privilege in compari-
son with the average citizens. Very important, cadres were able to offer their 
children the access to higher education and cadre positions, which established a 
tendency of self-reproduction of elites visible on the aggregate level (Best 
2012, Best et al. 2012, Salheiser 2010, Salheiser 2009). 
Figure 1: Tendencies of Self-Reproduction in Socialist Functional Elites 
 
Source: CCDB 1989, Collaborative Research Centre 580 (Jena) 
 
This was partly due to the traditional cultural affinity to education (Best 2005a) 
and status aspiration in the bourgeois or intelligentsia milieu but also due to 
another curious effect of self-selection: In the last period of the GDR, persons 
from workers’ families were rather bound to becoming workers themselves due 
to cultural imprinting and the better monetary incentives. It was more attractive 
for many to be a worker instead of a better-trained or even academically quali-
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fied employee because a white-collar employee earned less than a worker or 
just little more – but he or she was expected to take greater functional and 
social responsibilities at the same time. Of course, this was contra productive to 
social mobility and affirmed the rigid status order. Since the late 1970s, social 
inequality in the education and occupation system had increased considerably 
so self-reproduction of the intelligentsia became an important issue of arcane 
social science and even was discreetly addressed by GDR sociologists in offi-
cial publications (cf. Lötsch 1988). 
With distinctive vertical social differentiation (Best 2003), rigid status order 
and reduced social mobility in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, and 
while the economic crisis and the consumption deficits became more and more 
dramatic, pressure on the regime constantly grew. In addition, the Politbureau 
rejected any democratic reforms, quite contrary, it even reinforced repression. 
Eventually, GDR had turned into a society of inequality and injustice, and, of 
course, this fundamentally questioned Socialist rule and Socialist elites on the 
eve of the 1989 revolution.  
3. Elite Change and Societal Integration  
in East German Transformation 
In 1990 it was evident that the GDR left a dysfunctional economy, an ineffi-
cient and excessive bureaucracy, non-existing democratic and civil institutions, 
costly institutions of social welfare and social education thoroughly deligiti-
mised by the ideological burden and authoritarian malpractice. All of this 
clearly demanded drastic measures and a complete restart in the most societal 
subsystems which caused the disruption of biographies as a mass experience 
and high rates of unemployment in the general population. The restructuring of 
East German industry delivered one of the most striking examples for this 
profound structural break (cf. Gergs et. al. 1997, Gergs and Pohlmann 1999). 
No doubt, in the first place, the societal renewal demanded the dismissal of old 
elites who had personified, run and empowered the Socialist regime even be-
yond the centre of power (the Communist state party and rulers of the state) 
and also below the very tip of the cadre pyramid.  
Former GDR dissidents and the victims of state crimes have been underlin-
ing ever since the political change in 1989/1990 that the supportive personnel 
of the GDR regime cannot be reduced to the highest echelons of the SED party 
or to the State Security apparatus but, that GDR society, in fact, would not have 
been kept alive without a much broader foundation of collective agents and 
social strata who had conformed and aligned for both ideological and opportu-
nistic reasons, those who had come to an arrangement with the system. But in 
unified Germany, there was no opportunity for such a complicated, discriminat-
ing evaluation that would have surmounted a historical debate and led to prac-
tical consequences of social exclusion. The social exclusion of a broader stra-
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tum of former regime followers – the Socialist cadres and sub-elites in general 
– would have been maybe for the sake of justice but very certainly for the price 
of social peace.  
Roughly speaking, exclusion was completed after the higher representatives, 
such as the Party secretaries, the local state bureaucrats, the Director Generals 
(CEOs) of the state-owned companies, etc. had taken their hats and been sent 
into pension, prison, or both. The most prominent exponents of the power elite 
of the old regime were immediately ousted from their positions, and with no 
substantial backing in the population, they were left socially marginalized in 
post-socialist Germany.  
If one focuses on functional elites, one of the starting conditions of trans-
formation was that the very top level of government offices and administrative 
units of the GDR state in East Berlin abruptly became redundant in united 
Germany because their West German counterpart institutions took over their 
function. Only a strictly limited number of higher employees of the East Ger-
man state administration could remain in position after the restructuring of 
institutions. For instance, the complete Diplomatic Corps of the GDR was 
considered obsolete, so all those cadres were dismissed even though there were 
highly qualified and experienced country specialists among them (cf. Gebauer 
2011).  
Figure 2: Modes of Elite Transition 
 
 
On the level of the re-established federal states, the former GDR county ad-
ministrations (Räte der Bezirke) made way for a smaller number of state gov-
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ernments which also meant a considerable cutback of positions. Due to the 
political and ideological taintedness of the mid-to-top-level cadres, there was 
little personal continuity. As a rule, immediately after unification, West Ger-
mans entered the new East German offices and filled the ranks of head of de-
partments or referees since they were better qualified for and substantially 
experienced with democratic and bureaucratic institutions of the Federal Re-
public of Germany and the European Union than East Germans themselves. For 
a substantial part of the East German people, the elite import from the West 
was associated with takeover and paternalism. The term “colonialisation” was 
coined for the transition and especially with regard to the elite change.  
At a closer look, the colonialisation thesis was much too lump-sum an alle-
gation that was popularized due to the psychological effect of the visibility of 
some holders of elite positions, especially the most prominent ones, in public 
media. In fact: West Germans came as counsellors of the transition, likewise 
they were grandfathers of democratization and economic restructuring; includ-
ing prominent West German politicians such as Thuringian Prime Minister, 
Bernhard Vogel or the highly influential top manager, Lothar Späth (another 
former West German Prime Minister) in the state of Thuringia. Such high 
ranking politicians have made a start for the new Eastern Federal states of 
Germany, after some years they stepped back and passed their offices to native 
East German partisans. Today, East Germany’s Prime Ministers are East Ger-
mans, and most members of the state governments and the representative elites 
are “natives”, too (cf. Edinger 2009, Best 2005b).  
On the lower levels of the administrative hierarchy and the elite system, 
there really has been a considerable personnel import from the West, but not a 
drastic removal, extrusion and marginalization of East Germans (cf. Hornbostel 
2000). The two key criteria of career continuity were, first, the former affilia-
tion with the old Socialist regime and, second, the qualification, ability and 
willingness to re-embark on respective post-socialist careers. Much more im-
portant than biographical or affective closeness to the Socialist regime, the 
question for the intelligentsia was about the compatibility and convertibility of 
professional experiences and career assets (cf. Hoerning 2007).  
In marked contrast to the cutback of personnel on the central levels, on the 
lower levels of regional and municipal administration, in economy, and other 
societal subsystems, functional elites were offered diverse modes of inclusion, 
dependent on their qualification and their willingness and flexibility to adapt 
themselves. If they had not been directly and overtly involved in oppressive or 
unlawful actions of the state, if they were not politically tainted, they could 
very well remain in their positions, or achieved successful lateral mobility on 
the job market. Several empirical studies have produced evidence of this elite 
reproduction (Diewald, Goedicke and Mayer 2006, Diewald and Pollmann-
Schult 2009), with an eminent shift from political to “meritocratic” principles 
of personnel allocation and career advancements (Solga 2009).  
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With little exceptions, formal qualifications granted by GDR‘s higher edu-
cational institutions, such as university diplomas or doctoral degrees, have been 
acknowledged by Federal German law or converted to equivalent qualifica-
tions.  
A good example for subelites with academic training are the teachers. 
Teachers from GDR primary schools had often been qualified on special 
Teacher Schools on sub-academic level. Those vocational trainings did not 
necessarily demand university-entrance school diplomas or A-Levels. After 
1990, those teachers could mostly keep their jobs, became civil servants ac-
cording to Federal German law – with high payments equal to university-
trained teachers – and accordingly, could raise their socio-economic status.  
Due to the comparatively high level of the GDR system of vocational train-
ing, many problems of adaption could quite smoothly be helped with advanced 
on-the-job training. Apart from very specific cases (such as accountants spe-
cialized on socialist business, or Communist Youth leaders at schools) there 
was almost no global incompatibility of qualifications.  
Thus, if former members of the old functional elites could not embark on 
post-socialist careers, it was mostly due to the overall crisis on the job markets 
which likewise (or even more) concerned to non-elite members, e.g. workers. 
Restructuring of industry and labor markets had its deepest impact on the stra-
tum of blue-collar employees on lower skill levels, or service personnel. To 
give an instructive example, in a formerly large but now rapidly shrinking 
industrial company, the cook, the plumber or the lorry driver were soon to go, 
while the heads of department formed the new board of executive officers. 
Cadres of large industrial combines turned into managers of small to medium-
sized businesses, those who were bought by West German investors but also a 
considerable share of enterprises following the model of managerial ownership 
(Pohlmann and Gergs 1997, Pohlmann et al. 1996, Pohlmann and Schmidt 
1996). It has frequently been underlined that this conversion became possible 
due to the technocratic orientation of GDR’s economic elites that proved com-
patible with the demands of market economy (cf. Schmidt 2005, Best 2005a, 
Salheiser 2005). Since generational shift is delayed, substantial parts of the 
East German management remains to be staffed with former GDR cadres until 
today (Martens 2008).  
To give another example, in 1990, physicians from the GDR‘s state-owned 
medical care centers became physicians in their private practices, very often 
they kept their staff and even worked in the same buildings.  
All in all, East German former functional elite and subelite members had 
good opportunities to convert their social and cultural capital. As white-collar 
employees on the higher professional levels they actively participated in the 
transformation. Most of them have not been left behind. 
Higher ranking personnel from the GDR military and the State Security ap-
paratus, especially those who boasted no adequate civil qualifications, had it 
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comparatively worse. A former officer from the Engineer Corps of the dis-
solved National People’s Army might have become a free architect or got em-
ployed in a construction company, but a former Airforce pilot or a former State 
Security officer were very likely to eke out a living as a watchman, a door-
keeper or a janitor. Among the declassed former cadres, many older persons 
had it easier because they were to become pensioners very soon – and average 
pensions were raised considerably after Unification –, while the middle genera-
tion had to re-orientate and struggle for repositioning in unified Germany. 
It is remarkable that most of the new representative and functional elites in 
East Germany were former members of the lower GDR nomenclatura or intel-
ligentsia, or came from marginalized bourgeois milieus, rather than having a 
distinguished dissidents’ or reformers’ background. After the short revolution-
ary period of grass-roots democracy, there was a rapid return to the dominance 
of elite-powered political action and established parties. This also ended the 
factual influence of GDR dissidents and civil rights activists, who henceforth 
kept symbolic functions and a cultural salience in society but have had almost 
no political influence any longer. Ironic enough, they first dismissed their op-
pressors, then they disappeared. Prominent exponents such as Federal Presi-
dent, Joachim Gauck, who was elected in March 2012, are remarkable excep-
tions. 
When inspecting scientific use files of the German Federal Pension Insur-
ance (Rentenversicherung Bund), it becomes visible that highly qualified or 
academically trained persons who belonged to the second generation of the 
GDR population and whose social profiles closely match the traits of the for-
mer lower nomenclatura or socialist intelligentsia, earned significantly better 
than average in the 1990s which can be considered an evidence of post-socialist 
career continuation, or stability of their acquired social statuses. The persis-
tence of former GDR elite or subelite statuses is also expressed in a correlation 
matrix (cf. fig. 3) that was computed after statistically matching CCDB person-
nel mass data from GDR cadre administration with post-1990 panel survey 
data. However, Ronald Gebauer discusses further empirical findings about 
post-socialist career continuity and relevant mathematical problems of Statis-
tical Matching in his contribution to this volume.  
Roughly, there has been a transmogrification and conservation of important 
elements of the Socialist social structure (cf. Datenreport 2011). Due to their 
kept social status, it is not exaggerated to say that the majority of the GDR 
intelligentsia and the lower nomenclatura belongs to the “winners of the trans-
formation”. With the elements of the former GDR structure of social inequal-
ity, modes of intergenerational status tradition have also been continued across 
the societal change. 
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Figure 3: Continuity of Cadre Biographies? Elite Positions before and after 
1989 Statistical Matching of GDR Data (CCB) and SOEP Panel Survey Data 
Correlations: Somer’s D (symmetrical)                                        n=1.033 
 
Among the top elites, yet there has been little evidence for the coming of the 
East Germans on the national level, prominent politicians such as Chancellor 
Merkel being the rare exception. Among the largest German stock-holding 
companies, of which many are present in East Germany with production facili-
ties, not a single one is led by a CEO born and socialized in East Germany. In 
cultural elites, the East Germans are much more present, especially if we take a 
look at prominent actors, show stars, or sportswomen and sportsmen.  
4. Conclusion 
Has been transformation a success story? And if yes, for whom? After two 
decades, unified Germany features elites in the East and the West continuously 
converging towards each other with regard to their attitudes and their social 
composition. East German elites, by career continuity and social self-
reproduction, can be counted among the winners of transformation. But, at the 
same time, there is a growing mass-elite divergence. German Transformation 
has been and still is a project of integration. I’d like to argue that integration of 
the elites was successful, while thorough integration of the overall population 
might still be at stake especially in the under-developed jerkwater regions of 
East Germany, that are still ridden with structural deficits. In fact, there has 
been a visible modernization of East German economy and infrastructure, and 
some prosperous cities and regions that stand out as beacons of successful 
transformation. However, in colloquial talk, the Eastern states have quite com-
monly been referred to as that one region with great highways and shopping 
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malls but without enough jobs and without future perspectives. Among the East 
German population, this has caused a deep disorientation and resignation that 
could not been overcome until today. The East German discontent is also ex-
pressed in surveys that reveal a rather low satisfaction with democracy and an 
irritating high level of authoritarian and ethnocentric attitudes (Schmitt and 
Wolff 2011). Characteristically, those native East Germans whose social com-
mitment fosters the underdeveloped civil society, and who actively engage 
themselves against extremism and xenophobia, often share the biographic 
background of socialist cadres, i.e. they once belonged to sub-to-medium eche-
lons of the functional elites of the GDR (cf. Corsten 2005). 
In 1989/90, many East German intellectuals articulated their dissent and 
scepticism about the swiftness of complete transition to a merely enlarged 
FRG, while the masses readily wholeheartedly embraced the Unification and 
the symbols of newly found national identity.  
Ever since, the risks and costs of transformation have fostered negative atti-
tudes that Helmut Wiesenthal also described as a cognitive bias, or reservation 
of East German elites (Wiesenthal 2009, 10). National union and mutual ap-
proximation had especially been addressed in 1990 and the first years after, but 
cultural gaps and cultural separation between the East and the West have re-
mained. Differences ceased to exist only in the very youngest generation of 
Germans who have been born after 1989, who have been entirely socialized in 
unified Germany and whose everyday life is less affected by the emotional 
reservations, the biographical experiences or historical burdens of their elders. 
Nowadays, East German elites – as decision makers, communicators and role 
models – bear great responsibility to safeguard the project of Unification. Find-
ing adequate responses to the challenges of transformation and posttransforma-
tion remains the central task of Germany’s united elites. 
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